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Abstract
In this paper we discuss some proposed ways for defining the notion of structure and isomor-
phism between structures in the absence of formal language. We discuss Halvorson’s arguments
against the semantic view conception of the notion of structure and Glymour and Lutz’s crit-
icisms on Halvorson’s view. We suggest a new look at structures suggested by homotopy type
theory (HoTT). This approach is consistent with both the syntactic and the semantic view in
the philosophy of science.
Keywords: Philosophy of Science, Semantic View, Syntactic View, Homotopy Type Theory
1 Introduction
Recently, Halvorson argued that the semantic view in the philosophy of science leads to absurdity.
To show this, he interpreted scientific theories as collections of models (structures) and introduced
a version of isomorphism, called H-isomorphism, to get a criterion of identity between theories. He
then showed that this criterion leads to absurdities by making equivalent, clearly diﬀerent theories;
and vise versa. Many authors criticized his work, including van Fraseen, Glymour and Lutz, see [1],
[2], [3], [4] and [5].
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Van Fraassen insisted that using classes of structures, similar to the first-order structures as
studied in model theory, to interpret theories in physics in the semantic view is not appropriate
because scientific theories have some other aspects such as representation that are not reflected
by first-order models. Van Fraassen agrees with Halvorson that Semantic-L (semantic view minus
formal languages) leads to absurdity but contrary to him he does not accept that the Semantic-L
view is the same as the syntactic view [3].
Glymour and Lutz have some speculations about the details of Halvorson’s arguments, but they
both agree essentially with Halvorson that his arguments can be repaired so that they can destroy the
purely semantic view, i.e. Semantic-L. To do so, they make Halvorson’s definitions and assumptions
more clear.
In this paper, we discuss Halvorson’s claims and some objections to them. One of those objections
is that examining Halvorsons examples against the semantic view shows that all of them presupposes
languages and formal theories to exist, and this is forbidden by his own version of the semantic view,
according to Halvorson’s own view, no formal language and theory in the scientific realm exists. A
theory is not anything more than a class of models, this is the basic assumption Holvorson made.
We will discuss the power of this objection is Section 4.
But, what is a structure? Glymour and Lutz tried to make clear what Halvorson meant by a struc-
ture. For example, Lutz did this by defining H-structures and H-isomorphism between them. We
do not want to review the details of their contribution here. We will just explain our interpretation
of their works.
Moreover, we will suggest to consider structures in the realm of Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT),
see [6]. HoTT is a new branch of mathematics that combines aspects of Homotopy theory and type
theory. HoTT is based on the constructive intensional type theory of Martin Löf, see [7]. The newly
suggested univalence axiom of Voevodsky based on homotopic interpretation of type theory implies
that isomorphic structures can be identified. This suggests a new foundation of mathematics and
convenient machine implementation. We use HoTT to get a new look at structures.
2 Model theory and H-structures
In this chapter, we review the proposed definitions of structures and isomorphism between them.
For standard model theory, we use the standard text [8] by Wilfried Hodges. Diﬀerent books on
model theory may use diﬀerent notations or use diﬀerent (but mathematically equivalent) definitions
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on the same topic, these definitions, although mathematically equivalent, may have diﬀerent conse-
quences philosophically, see e.g. [9]. So, we should be careful about our definitions. But, Hodges not
only gave an exact definition of structure but also provided a more general criterion for definitions
of structure to be valid.
First-order model theory is based on the basic idea in mathematical logic in general and model
theory as part of mathematical logic that models provide interpretations of symbols of the language
and axioms of the theories which are syntactic objects, and can not be considered in isolation from
the syntax. Yes, structures, i.e. models without being considered as interpretations of any things,
are legitimate objects in logic and mathematics, but when one wants to use them one needs the
language they interpret. So, syntax and semantics are inseparable.
The notion of structure is a fundamental notion in model theory. According to Hodges:
Our usage of the word structure reflects the distinction between structures and models in
the context of standard model theory.
In order to talk about mathematical objects, one needs to name them:
One of the maxims of model theory is this: name the elements of your structure first,
then decide how they should behave.
But what is a structure:
Some writers define (a structure) A to be an ordered pair (dom(A); f) where f is a
function taking each symbol S to the corresponding item SA. The important thing is to
know what the symbols and the ingredients are, and this can be indicated in any reasonable
way. For example a model theorist may refer to the structure (R;+; ; :; 0; 1; <).
With some common sense the reader can guess that this means the structure whose domain
is the set of real numbers, with constants 0 and 1 naming the numbers 0 and 1, a 2-ary
relation symbol naming the relation, 2-ary function symbols + and : naming addition and
multiplication respectively, and a 1-ary function symbol naming minus.
What are the names:
The symbol L will be used to stand for signatures. Later it will also stand for languages
- think of the signature of A as a kind of rudimentary language for talking about A. If A
has signature L, we say A is an L-structure.
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For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the relational structures, i.e. sets equipped
with relations but not constants or functions. So, we have the following standard definition.
Definition 2.1. (L-structure): Assume that L is a set of relation symbols. By a L-structure, we
just mean a set as the domain and an interpretation function which assigns relations on the domain
to the members of L.
As Hodges pointed this out in the quoted text above, L-structures are always defined in the way
that L is known from it, however, sometimes we are given apparently only the structure not L, but
the main assumption is this:
We shall assume that the signature of a structure can be read oﬀ uniquely from the
structure.
Another apparently possible way of defining structure is as follows, see [9].
Definition 2.2. (I-structure): An I-structure is a set as its domain and a collection of relations on
the domain indexed by the set I.
As pointed out by Lutz, an I-structure can be essentially considered as an L-structure in most
cases by just considering the set of indexes I as L itself. But, in some cases, it may not be the case.
For a simple example of such I-structure, given by Halvorson, see [1]. Anyway, if the type (order) of
the relations are given, then the L-structure related to the I-structures will be completely known.
Now, we recall the definition of a structure implicitly used by Halvorson. Halvorson studied
models which are supposed to exist in the absence of any formal language. In this case, a structure
should be defined very general. He did not define what he meant by a structure, but Lutz summarized
it as follows.
Definition 2.3. (H-structure): An H-structure M is a set M as its domain and a set of relations on
M.
Note that, an H-structure is not an L-structure as the signature of it can not be specified. In a
structure as by Hodges understood, each relation on the domain has a "name" already given by the
structure.
Also, in an I-structure, each relation Ri has its name, i.e. i, but in an H-structure there are
no names. Formalizing is forbidden in the semantic view. So, Halvorson is right when he uses H-
structures in the paradigm of the semantic view instead of the standard structures of model theory.
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Let I be an arbitrary (index) set. An H-structure M can be considered as a collection M of
I-structures. In the special case where there are only one-place predicate symbols, the cardinal of
M, jMj, is 2jMjjIj. This is the number of ways one may name the elements of 2M using I-alphabets.
When are two structures identical? In the case of L-structures and I-structures, the answer is
the standard definition of isomorphism in model theory: just correspond the relations with the same
name. But this simple answer does not work for H-structures where there are no names.
One possible way to define a L-structure out of a H-structure and define isomorphism accordingly,
is to hear to Hodges:
A healthy general principle is that, other things being equal, signatures should be chosen
so that the notions of homomorphism and substructure agree with the usual notions for
the relevant branch of mathematics.
In the case of science, one should make attention to the part of science in the consideration and
choose the language accordingly. This may be possible or not in a specific case. Anyway, it shows
that the importance of isomorphism and signature are equal. Without signature, there would be no
isomorphism.
Anyway, Halvorson tried to define isomorphism for H-structures. Actually, he didn’t define it
explicitly, but his examples show what he had in mind.
Definition 2.4. (H-isomorphism): Two H-structures are H-isomorphic, if they have the same num-
ber of relations and they are isomorphic under some naming of their relations by an index set I.
Halvorson and Glymour gave H-structures which are H-isomorphic but not elementary equivalent,
concluding that H-isomorphism is not a good criterion of identity, see also [2]. But in the absence
of language, being elementary equivalent does not have any possible meaning. We discuss this issue
in the next chapter.
3 Criticizing Halvorson’s arguments
Now we have done with clarifying Halvorson’s notions of H-structure and H-isomorphism. In this
chapter we examine his arguments against the semantic view.
Actually, Halvorson’s examples involve theories and languages. Halvorson used these examples
to show that the notion of H-isomorphism, i.e. the only possible version of isomorphism for H-
structures, leads to absurdity. His examples involve formal languages and theories and models of
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theories. But according to his own description of the semantic view, there are no such things in the
context of science and its mathematical interpretation based on H-structures. So, he used something
that was already discarded by himself.
Does the objection destroy Halvorson’s result? In one sense, yes, if there are no theories in science,
if one even should not use formal language, then theories should not be used when one wants to show
that the semantic view is mistaken. But, even if there are no scientific theories, of course there are
formal theories in mathematics and logic. Halvorson’s counterexamples to the semantic view came
from logic, especially model theory. Halvorson wants to formalize the scientific method in logic, so
scientific models should be interpreted as structures studied in logic. So, one can say that Halvorson
is right if one accepts this formalization. In this sense, his counterexamples work. Glymour also
rejects this objection to Halvorson’s argument, see [4].
Here, we will explain my view on this matter. My focus is on the consistency of Halvorson’s
arguments. Structures in the standard model theory are L-structures, for some signature L. Halvor-
son’s claim is that Semantic+L=Syntactic, so he could not have used L-structures. And indeed, he
didn’t! Halvorson’s objections are based on H-structures. But by using them, he expelled himself
out of the world of the standard model theory. So he should not have used first-order theories in his
arguments, there is no H-theory in the standard model theory. So, we do not think that Halvorson’s
argument against the Semantic-L is coherent.
Halvorson’s conception of mathematical structures is closed to Brouwer’s constructive interpreta-
tion of them. According to Brouwer mathematical objects are mental constructions and independent
of the language used to describe them. In the next chapter we discuss an approach that formalizes
this idea.
4 The semantic view in the context of HoTT
Homotopy type theory is a new branch of mathematics which is based on Homotopy theoretic
interpretation of constructive type theory: types as topological spaces and tokens of types as elements
of the spaces, see [6]. Two elements in a space are considered identical, if there is a continuous
path between them. Two spaces are identical, if they are homotopic. Let A and B be topological
spaces. Two continuous functions f; g : A ! B are homotopic if there exists a continuous function
h : [0; 1]A! B s.t. h(0; x) = f(x) and h(1; x) = g(x), for all x 2 A. We denote this by f ' g. If
there are such functions, A and B are considered identical.
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Under this interpretation, the Univalence Axiom proposed by Voevodsky seems plausible.
Univalence Axiom. (A ' B) ' (A = B).
Here, A and B are two types which are tokens of a universe of small types U , A = B is the type
of (proofs of) identifications between A and B, and A ' B is the type of equivalences between A
and B. The equivalence is another relation between types that is similar to isomorphism, and for
the present discussion the diﬀerence between them does not matter, see e.g. [10]. Univalence Axiom
informally says that: Two equivalent types (spaces) are identical (internally). It means that there
is nothing in HoTT that can distinguish A and B.
We can use this framework to refine the notion of structure. A L-structure can be easily defined
in the context of HoTT using dependent types, see [11]. A consequence of the Univalence Axiom
is that two isomorphic elements of the type of L-structures are equal, and hence shares the same
properties, see [6]. We denote the type of L-structures by L.
What is the advantage of using the HoTT framework to study structures, [11]:
Indeed, in a set theoretic framework, it is possible to formulate properties using the mem-
bership relations, for instance the property that the carrier set of the structure contains
the natural number 0, property that is not preserved in general by isomorphisms. Intu-
itively, the set theoretical description of a structure is not abstract enough since we can
talk about the way this structure is built up.
What is a theory? In HoTT, we may consider a theory in the language L as a subtype of the type
of all L-structures sharing certain properties, e.g. type of monoids or groups. More precisely, tokens
of an L-theory are of the form (M; p) where M is a L-structure and p is a proof that M satisfies
certain property P. The language of HoTT is much more stronger than the language of first-order
logic therefore much more properties can be chosen in place of P.
We also need the work of Ladyman and Presnel on the philosophical interpretation of HoTT,
see [12]. They consider the framework of HoTT formally and present the following semantics for
HoTT. They showed that HoTT can be considered as an autonomous foundation for mathematics,
independent of any particular branch of mathematics, including Homotopy theory.
According to [12], a type is a mathematical concept and its tokens are instances of the concept
(e.g., Natural Number-2). Types are considered intentionally, e.g., the type of even divisors of 9
is not equal to the type of even divisors of 11. When we work formally in HoTT, we construct
expressions according to the rules for generating formulas. They are names of tokens and types.
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Note that the above interpretation is completely parallel to the constructionist interpretation of
mathematics by Brouwer. And it is very close to what Halvorson wants from the semantic paradigm
when considering structures in the philosophy of science. Indeed, an H-structure as defined above is
not the true interpretation of the notion of structure as it is clear from the example of group versus
autoset in Halvorson’s [1]:
In other words, although an autoset is not a group, each autoset carries definable group
theoretic structure (an identity element and an inverse function). But the very notion
of definability is not available via a purely semantic approach: the notion of definability
presupposes reference to the language in which the theories were formulated.
According to this interpretation of structures which is consistent with HoTT, a structure is a
mental concept, and not a linguistic object. Language of HoTT is only used to name the mathemat-
ical types in order to make us able to talk about them and are dispensable. Moreover, a structure
is not a set together with some relations on it, it is a unique object and can not be separated.
Summing up, L-structures for some signature L, are just members of a specific type, we may call
it L. A type L is a (mathematical) concept and its tokens, structures, can be shown like this M:L.
In this approach, such a type L, is not a set of structures, note that in HoTT types are considered
intentionally. Therefore, Halvorson’s criticisms do not apply in this context.
As an example, according to this interpretation, the theory of autosets and the theory of groups,
i.e. the type of autosets A and the type of groups G, as tokens of the type of theories, are not
identical. However, one can show that they are internally equal by finding a token of the identity
type IdS(A;G). Two theories are identical (isomorphic) if there is proof of it. This proof is a
mathematical one and not just a logical proof.
Moreover, the properties which define theories are not restricted to the ones expressible in first-
order logic, a common objection to the syntactic view (or its most recent version called received view
proposed by Carnap), see [5]. So, this approach to structures is consistent with both the syntactic
and the semantic approaches.
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